Is the U.S. at Full  Employment? Should We Put the Brakes on Job Growth to Avoid Inflation Down the  Road?                                                                                 frank  stricker
                    The answers are no and  no. Even when the official unemployment rate is 4.1%, we are not close to real  full employment. And it does not appear that inflation is about to surge. If the  authorities are really worried about it, they should develop counter-measures  that do not cause more unemployment.  
                    How these issues were worked  on over the last fifty years is instructive. In 1969, after a 1964 tax cut, and  hefty spending increases for the Vietnam war and for social programs, prices  were rising 5.5% a year. But the official rate of unemployment was down to 3.5%  and that lifted millions of people out of poverty. But there were  millions more who were still unemployed or  underemployed. Some of these people rioted in America's cities. A special Department  of Labor survey of ten inner-city communities revealed levels of unemployment  that were much higher than those in the regular unemployment census. 
                    Yet in the late 60s  and the 1970s, anti-inflation concerns often replaced anti-poverty and  employment concerns. Reducing demand for  goods and workers was used to limit wage and price increases. A short recession  in 1969-1971 raised unemployment and but did not moderate inflation much. Then world  demand pushed food prices up and oil prices surged. The latter were a long-term  and major cause of higher inflation, but it over time it seemed that wages got  more blame than oil prices. 
                    In 1971-1974 President  Richard Nixon tried wage-and-price controls--an interesting idea that worked  pretty well in World War II--but unionists felt that wages were more tightly  controlled than prices; and business leaders did not like price controls. So a  possibly useful method for maintaining job growth while restraining prices was dismissed.  Then the administration and the Federal Reserve engineered a deep  recession--the worst since the 30s. But   textbook results did not follow. A new phenomenon was born: stagflation.  Unemployment, which reached 8.5%, was supposed to limit wage and price  increases, but it hardly made a dent. You'd have thought that this challenge to  economic assumptions would cause experts to rethink the basics. If a recession with  8.5% unemployment did not have much effect on prices, perhaps the high-unemployment  approach was wrong. But many experts doubled down on the old-time religion: if  high unemployment did not tame inflation, then the economy needed more of it  all the time. Not to worry. In the late 70s, former Nixon advisor, conservative  economist Herbert Stein, wrote in the Wall  Street Journal that people should simply consider that 7% unemployment was full  employment. Guilt-problem solved,
                    In the early 80s,  Federal Reserve Chair Paul Volcker and President Ronald Reagan gave America a  shocking recession with very high unemployment. The White House also joined the  war on unions and working-class living standards. This recession and some lucky  events got inflation rates way down. Job totals grew strongly, but many jobs were  lousy ones. 
                    Economists, meanwhile,  refined anti-worker inflation cures. A source here was conservative economist Milton  Friedman's 1960s idea of a Natural Rate of Unemployment, below which  unemployment must never be allowed to go. This Natural Rate idea was supported  by contrived ideas of how workers reasoned about jobs and inflation. In  the 70s, Friedman's idea began to morph into  NAIRU, the Non-Accelerating Inflation Rate of Unemployment.  The causative links between unemployment,  wages, and prices were not always clear. But NAIRU was presented as a quasi-scientific  way to determine how far down unemployment could go before wage-and-price  inflation accelerated. While something like NAIRU seemed to work in the  Reagan-Volcker recession, it did not have reliable predictive power. But it supplied  scholarly sounding gobbledygook to justify the idea that workers had to bear  the cost of inflation-fighting in the form of lost jobs and wrecked  communities.
                    As cheap imports  ballooned and union membership sagged, the official unemployment number could  get pretty low (4% in 2000) without much increase in prices. But NAIRU lived on  and was often equated with full employment. Economists thus defined full  employment by reasoning backward from the level of unemployment they guessed  was needed to keep the lid on wages, not forward by what was necessary to  employ everyone who wanted a job. More economists grew skeptical of NAIRU, but in  2017-2018, the staffs at the Federal Reserve and the Congressional Budget  Office seem to believe this: 4.7% unemployment = full employment = NAIRU. But the  official unemployment rate is 4.1%--lower than NAIRU--and wages and prices are  not taking off. 
                    There are several  reasons why 4.1% unemployment does not send wages and prices soaring. These  reasons include falling union density and a flood of cheap foreign goods. But another  reason is that real unemployment is much higher than 4.1%. There are millions  of potential workers and quiet job-wanters who are ready to work but not  counted as unemployed. The U.S. has a labor surplus, not a labor shortage. It's  true, for example, that in some locales, there aren't enough truckers available  at customary wage levels, so owners have to pay more. That's good, but let's not  get too excited: $19.50 an hour and no company-supported health insurance is  not exactly the lap of luxury, especially if you are making sizeable payments  on your truck. 
                    We need to reframe the  conventional view of current labor markets. There is no general shortage of  workers today. Labor markets are just getting to where they should be. A huge  fraction of workers are still paid rotten wages. It's not a labor shortage when  tens of millions of workers earn less and often much less than $20 an hour. There  are millions of potential employees outside the labor force and ready to work. (There  is some duplication among the following groups, but the total may be as high as  ten million.) There are five million people every month who say they want a job  although they are not currently looking for one. These people offer a variety  of explanations for why they are not looking, including illness, family  responsibilities, and the belief that they will not find a job; some of them  eventually go to work. 
                    Some of these 5  million are among the 7 million prime-age (25-54) males who are not working or even  looking for work. Some of these men live in depressed areas in Chicago,  Detroit, Cleveland, Paterson and Ocean City, New Jersey, rural areas of Alabama  and Mississippi, West Virginia, East St. Louis, El Centro, California, and dozens  of other left-behind communities. Some are disabled and some are drug addicts. But  the number of disabled people in the labor force is rising and so is the number  of prime-age men. There is, also, more demand for ex-prisoners--people who usually  face huge barriers to getting hired. It is noteworthy too that the rate of  employment for people without high-school diplomas is rising and that the percentage  of people 55 and over who are in the labor force, which was 30% in 1993, is now  40%. These facts show that there is a large pool of labor that is not called  unemployed but is virtually unemployed and ready to work.
                    So looking at the big  picture, we can emphasize the labor shortage: it's a boohoo situation for  employers who have to accept the kinds of workers they used to reject. How  tragic for them. Or we can say that labor markets are just beginning to  function as they should. And good times for workers have barely begun. Over the  last year, after-inflation wages for average employees and for new hires have not  moved. 
                    Going forward, we  should push for fuller employment--let's start by aiming for 3.0% in the  official count--and we want wages on the up escalator. We've not had 3.0% since  World War II. Before we get there, will inflation fears cause the Fed to put  the brakes on job growth? What should people do about inflation? If inflation  rates are only modestly higher, and less than wage increases, people should pressure  the authorities to leave things alone. If wages are increasing at 4 to 5% and  prices at 2 to 3%, and consistently so, that's a good deal for workers in the  lower half. But what if prices surge? I don't have the answer but there are a variety  of options. I wish some of the geniuses who run the government and the economy would  have their experts working on anti-inflation policies that don't push millions  of people down into unemployment and poverty. If politicians really love  workers--many say they do--why have they gifted corporations and rich people  with trillions of dollars in 2001, 2003, and 2017--no obligation to create jobs  or raise wages--but not approved a new WPA to provide good jobs for millions  who still need them, or authorized a measly hundred million dollars for  Institutes to Study Solutions to High Inflation That Don't Require More  Unemployment and Low Pay? Finally, why is the Fed is turning NAIRU-ish, raising  interest rates to slow job growth, when there is still a lot of underlying  unemployment to solve? 
        Frank Stricker is in the National Jobs for All  Coalition. He taught history and labor studies at CSUDH for thirty-five years.  He has just written What Ails the  American Worker? Unemployment and Rotten Jobs: History, Explanations, Remedies.  For some sources behind this essay, e-mail frnkstricker@aol.com.